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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress has statutorily defined a homeless child as one who
either lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate residence or has a primary
nighttime residence in a shelter, an institution, or a place not nor-
mally used as a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings.'
In reality, a homeless child is one who:
suffer[s] the loss associated with separation from [her] home, .
belongings, and pets; the uncertainty of when [she] will eat [her]
next meal and where [she] will sleep during the night; the fear of
who might hurt [her] or [her] family members as they live in
strange and frequently violent environments; the embarrassment of
being noticeably poor; and the frustration of not being able to do
anything to alleviate [her] (or [her] family's) suffering.2
The condition of homelessness makes it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for a child to attend and to benefit from school. However, there is
no institution better situated to impact upon the cycle3 of homeless-
1. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (1988).
2. Division of Special Programs, Texas Educ. Agency, The Texas State Plan for the
Education of Homeless Children and Youth 1989-1990, at 13 (1989).
3. Some commentators view the conditions of homelessness as creating an underclass,
"enhanc[ing] the underclass that may already have existed, and, combining newly poor and
always-poor together in one common form of penury, assign[ing] the children of them all to an
imperiled life." J. KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN 20 (1988). Further, Kozol believes
homelessness is:
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ness than the school. The resolution of this paradox will turn on the
efficacy of the educational rights that states and federal governments
provide and that the states implement for homeless children. These
rights evolve from legislative and litigative determinations that are
shaped by legal, political, and social forces. If these forces are
allowed to eclipse the reality of the homeless child's educational
needs, then educational rights will become a sham. Educators can
only realize viable educational rights for homeless children, ones that
can make a difference, through a process that identifies and holds con-
stant the educational needs of homeless children.
The homeless school-age child is educationally at risk.4 Life
within multi-problem families,5 in conditions6 that are well below the
[an] institution, one of our own invention, which will mass-produce pathologies,
addictions, violence, dependencies, perhaps even a longing for retaliation, for
self-vindication, on a scale that will transcend, by far, whatever deviant behaviors
we may try to write into [the homeless persons'] past. It is the present we must
deal with, and the future we must fear.
Id. at 21. Special educators perceive the homeless environment as a breeding ground for hand-
icapping conditions. They question how many of today's homeless children are tomorrow's
handicapped and homeless citizens. Based on descriptions of homeless children in today's
schools, researchers have concluded that "[t]he future portrait appears to focus on underedu-
cated, cognitively deficient, socially retarded, emotionally debilitated, and potentially handi-
capped citizens of tomorrow." Russell & Williams, Homeless Handicapped Children: A
Special Education Perspective, 5 CHILDREN'S ENV'TS Q. 3 (1988).
4. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., State Plan for the Education of Illinois Homeless Children
and Youth FYs 1988-90, at 3 (1988) ("Although there is considerable debate about the service
delivery mechanism most suited to addressing the educational needs of homeless children and
youth, it is clear that such children or youth are at risk."). The Illinois plan identifies the
special needs of homeless children, classifying these needs as similar to those of other
populations at risk. Id. at 3-4. Populations are "at risk" educationally when, because of
certain socio/psychological characteristics-such as emotional or developmental disabilities or
learning disorders-those in the population are at risk of the system's failing to meet their
needs.
5. The factors that can trigger homelessness, such as drug abuse, fire, or domestic
violence, are problems that are exacerbated by the problems associated with the condition of
homelessness, such as insecurity, fear, and loss of self esteem. See generally J. KOZOL, supra
note 3.
6. A United States Department of Education report showed that 12% of all homeless
children live in publicly operated shelters, 41% live in privately operated shelters, 25% are
living temporarily with friends or relatives, and 22% are living in other locations, including
welfare hotels, shelters for runaways and battered children, campgrounds, parks, or abandoned
buildings. HOMELESS CHILDREN AND YOUTH PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON HOMELESS CHILDREN AND YOUTH 8 (1990) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC.]. Newspaper reporters and commentators have provided less quantitative, but more
insightful, information on the effects of the homeless student's living conditions. See, e.g.,
Sanchez, For Homeless, School No Shelter from Shame, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1988, at Al, col.
4 (describing teachers faced with educating children who disappear for weeks at a time, and
with building self-esteem in children who have been pelted by rocks and taunted by other
children while walking home); Schmitt, Ordeal for Homeless Students in Suburbs, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 16, 1987, at Bl, col. 2 (reporting that "motel children.., as young as [five] or [six] years
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nationally defined standard of poverty,7 leaves the homeless child
with unmet physical and emotional needs. These conditions are pro-
ducing a population of children handicapped with severe psychologi-
cal problems that affect their capacity to learn.' Although formal
clinical studies are just emerging and long-term data are not yet avail-
able, preliminary indications are that developmental delays, severe
depression, anxiety, and learning difficulties are common among
homeless children. 9 Researchers have extrapolated findings from
related areas of psychological research-for example, the effects of
rootlessness on migrant children-that identify additional impedi-
ments to the homeless child's learning process. 0
Historically, advocacy groups surveying limited populations
old" endure school days in excess of eight hours long because of bus and train commutes to
and from their temporary shelters). Jonathan Kozol's case histories of homeless persons
provides some of the most vivid descriptions of homeless children's lives. See J. KOZOL, supra
note 3. "Families [in emergency shelters] are confronted with drug paraphernalia in shared
rest rooms.... [HIomeless children play in corridors while, twenty feet away, prostitutes and
clients take turns waiting to make use of the same room." Id. at 89. To illustrate the
disempowerment of these families in the face of bureaucracy, Kozol recounted the experience
one mother of three had while waiting for a temporary shelter:
"We spent another seven days sitting in the welfare center, 9:00 to 5:00, and
every evening 6:00 to 8:00 A.M. trying to sleep there.... All we had to eat that
week was peanut butter, jelly and cheese sandwiches." Not wanting to
exaggerate, she adds: "They gave my children juice and little packages of milk."
Id. at 158-59.
7. The U.S. in the 1980s may be the first society in history in which children are
distinctly worse off than adults; that is to say that a large proportion of children
in the U.S. live below our defined standard of poverty; that there are a large
number of such children; and that no other age group may be so characterized.
Bassuk & Rubin, Homeless Children: A Neglected Population, 57 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
279, 284 (1987) (citing D. MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION (1986)).
8. A 1985 study of 51 mothers and 78 children living in shelters found that:
Forty-seven percent of the preschoolers exhibited impairments in language skills
and motor and social development. A childhood depression scale revealed that
51% of the children over the age of five were depressed. This is higher than that
of comparably poor children and those registered in a psychiatric clinic. It was
inferred that the high levels of depression and anxiety were interfering with their
capacity to learn: 54% had repeated a grade and 29% were in special education
classes.
Gewirtzman & Fodor, The Homeless Child at School: From Welfare Hotel to Classroom, 66
CHILD WELFARE 237, 241 (1987) (citing E. Bassuk, The Feminization of Homelessness:
Homeless Families in Boston Shelters (1985) (unpublished manuscript available from Harvard
Science Center)).
9. Bassuk & Rubin, supra note 7, at 284. Researchers gathered clinical information from
82 homeless families, including 156 children, living in 14 family shelters. Id. at 279. The
study indicated that approximately half of the sheltered homeless children required psychiatric
referral and evaluation. Id. at 284.
10. The effects of rootlessness include a sense of life as temporary, developmental
regression, insufficient pre-learning skills, increased anxiety, and a wide array of behavioral
problems. Gewirtzman & Fodor, supra note 8, at 240.
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have generated information concerning the educational status of
homeless children.X' Institutions that were the potential providers of
educational services to these at risk children had no systematic
approach for identifying either the children's numbers or needs. Con-
sequently, educational practitioners understood neither the extent nor
the nature of the problem. 12
However, by 1987, through the efforts of advocacy groups, legis-
lators recognized that families with children were the fastest growing
segment of a rapidly expanding homeless population.13 Consequently,
when Congress finally responded to the national problem of homeless-
ness 14 through the passage of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act ("McKinney Act" or "Act") 15 in 1987, it addressed
11. In 1987, the Center for Law and Education, the National Coalition for the Homeless,
the National Network of Runaway and Youth Services, and The Homelessness Exchange
surveyed approximately 110 shelter providers throughout the country to document difficulties
experienced by homeless school age children in enrolling and continuing in school. S. Jackson,
The Education Rights of Homeless Children 1 (May 1990), reprinted in MATERIALS ON THE
EDUCATION OF HOMELESS CHILDREN (May 1990 ed.) (available from the Center for Law and
Education, Cambridge, MA). One-third of the shelter providers surveyed reported instances
in which these children were denied access to school. Id. The survey identified a variety of
problems that contributed to this denial. Id.
12. In 1987, the Center for Law and Education surveyed state officials and found that state
officials had little knowledge of either the number of homeless school-aged children or the
problems that they faced. Id. This contrasts with an advocacy study done during the same
year which found that approximately 500,000 children were homeless and that, within an
eight-city survey, 43% of these homeless children did not attend school. NATIONAL
COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, BROKEN LIVES: DENIAL OF EDUCATION TO HOMELESS
CHILDREN 1 (1987) (citing a 1987 Child Welfare League of America study).
13. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 12, at I. This growth resulted
in 40% of the homeless population being composed of members of families. Id. In 1984,
estimates of the total United States homeless population ranged from a low by the Reagan
administration of 250,000 to 350,000 persons, to a National Coalition of the Homeless estimate
of three million persons. National Coalition for the Homeless, Homelessness in the United
States: Background and Federal Response-A Briefing Paper for Congressional Candidates 4
n. I (Sept. 1988) [hereinafter National Coalition for the Homeless Briefing Paper]. In 1987,
studies surveying cities around the country found an average increase in the homeless
population of 21% to 25%. Id. at 4 (citing U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE
CONTINUING GROWTH OF HUNGER, HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY IN AMERICA'S CITIES:
1987, at 15 (1987); and NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, PUSHED OUT:
AMERICA'S HOMELESS, THANKSGIVING, 1987, at 1 (1987)).
14. The first Congressional hearings on homelessness, since the Depression, began in 1982.
National Coalition for the Homeless Briefing Paper, supra note 13, at 18. However, the
Reagan Administration's position-to the extent that it recognized homelessness-was that it
was a local problem that required no federal response. Id. (citing The Federal Response to the
Homeless Crisis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human
Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 205 (1984)).
15. Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11301
(1988)). The Act's educational provisions originally covered fiscal years 1987 and 1988. 42
U.S.C. § 11432(g) (1988). In November 1988, Congress reauthorized the Act, including its
educational provisions, to extend through fiscal year 1990. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
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legislatively the plight of homeless children who were being denied an
education. 1 6
This Comment examines the body of educational rights for
homeless children that is emerging from the McKinney Act and from
educational jurisprudence arising from other federal statutes. It
examines educational rights as applied both to the barriers that deny
homeless children access to education, and educational practices that
allow children to receive a free, appropriate public education once
these barriers have been overcome. Section II of the Comment ana-
lyzes statutory educational rights for homeless children contained in
the educational provisions of the McKinney Act. 17  Because the
McKinney Act is a non-prescriptive statute,1 8 one which delegates a
substantial amount of power to the states, 9 and yet provides no sanc-
tions for noncompliance, the rights derived from this statute are
extremely dependant on the initiative of individual states to imple-
ment the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the analysis in Section II
relies extensively on information contained in state educational
agency plans. Section III provides a selected overview of the special
education jurisprudence that courts have developed under the Educa-
Assistance Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-628, 102 Stat. 3224 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 11301 (1988)). In November 1990; Congress reauthorized the Act, with substantial
modifications to its educational provisions, to extend through fiscal year 1993. Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.. 101-645, 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 4673 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11301).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435 (1988).
17. Id. This Comment's analysis covers the McKinney Act's educational provisions prior
to the passage of the 1990 amendments. See supra note 15. For a discussion of the promise
that the newly enacted provisions hold, see infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
18. The McKinney Act authorizes the allocation of funds to state educational agencies to
enable them to carry out policies related to providing a free, appropriate public education for
homeless children. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11432-11433 (1988); see also U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
Nonregulatory Guidance 1 (Nov. 1987). Congress has left the implementation of these policies
to the determination of the state (or local) education agency. For example, section 11432 of
the Act requires states to provide procedures for resolving disputes over educational
placements, but does not specify the particular dispute resolution process to be used. 42
U.S.C. § 11432(e)(l)(B) (1988).
19. The United States Department of Education reviews state plans to ensure that states
address the issues contained in the Act. Where the state follows the nonregulatory guidance
provided by the Department of Education, the state is considered to be in compliance with the
educational provisions of the Act. U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 18, at 1. However, when
the states applied for fiscal year 1988 McKinney funds, the Department of Education initially
rejected 30 of the 51 plans for failure to either address or adequately address the educational
provisions of the Act. S. Jackson, supra note 11, at 5. As a result of plan revisions,
clarifications, and negotiations between state officials and the Department of Education, the
Department of Education approved all state plans by September 1989. Id. Apart from its
authority to review the content of state plans, the Department of Education has no real
enforcement power and must rely, to a great extent, on the assurances contained in each state's
application for funding.
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tion for All Handicapped Children Act,2° the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,21 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871,22 and discusses ways in
which educators and advocates can use this jurisprudence as a vehicle
to assert additional educational rights for homeless children. The
Comment concludes with an assessment of the effectiveness of assert-
ing the educational rights of homeless children to enable them to par-
ticipate in a meaningful educational process directed toward breaking
the cycle of homelessness.
This Comment's premise is that educational rights that provide
access to a free, appropriate public education for all homeless chil-
dren can accomplish this task. However, success depends on the
degree to which legislatures, courts, educational practitioners, and
advocates, within legal, political, and social constraints, are able to
shape substantive educational rights to meet the educational needs of
homeless children.
II. EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND THE STEWART B. MCKINNEY
HOMELESS ASSISTANCE ACT
The McKinney Act's educational provisions reflects Congress'
concern with the increasing number of homeless families with chil-
dren.23 The drafters of the Act designed the educational provisions to
ensure equal access to education for homeless children 24 by requiring
states to ascertain the extent of the need for educational services to
homeless children and to develop state plans to provide these serv-
ices.21 The Act provides grant funds to state educational agencies to
accomplish the Act's purposes. 26 Each state educational agency must
submit annually a report prepared from designated state coordinator
activities designed to: (1) gather data on the number and location of
school-age homeless children; (2) determine the nature and extent of
problems that homeless children have gaining admission or access to
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
23. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 174, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 93, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 441, 472.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 11431(1) (1988).
25. Id. § 11432.
26. Id. § 11432(a). The nonregulatory guidelines issued by the United States Department
of Education requires states to use grant funds for the following purposes:
(1) To carry out the policies... of the Act .... ; (2) To establish or designate an
Office of Coordinator of Education of Homeless Children and Youth; and (3) To
prepare and carry out a state plan to provide for education of homeless children
and youth. The funds may not be used, however, to pay the actual costs of
educating homeless children and youth.
U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 18, at 2-3.
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public schools; and (3) identify the special educational needs of home-
less children and the difficulties that states experience in determining
these needs.27
The state coordinator is responsible for developing and carrying
out the state plan. Each state plan must contain provisions granting
authority to the agency or person responsible for making determina-
tions under the Act,2" and must provide procedures for dispute reso-
lution. 29 The state plan assures, "to the extent practicable under
requirements relating to education established by State law, that local
educational agencies within the State comply with the [McKinney
Act's] requirements."' 30 Local educational agencies must either con-
tinue the educational placement of the homeless child in her school
district of origin or enroll the child where she is actually living-
whichever is in the child's best interest.31 Within this placement, edu-
cational services32 for the homeless child are to be comparable to
those offered to other students in the school selected. 3 The local
agency also is responsible for maintaining the school records of each
homeless child.3 4
Data from the compilation of the 1989 annual reports submitted
by state educational agencies indicate that there are between 216,000
and 273,000 school-age homeless children in this country.3 5 An esti-
mated twenty-eight percent of these children, or as many as 67,400,
are not attending school.3 6 Although educators believe these numbers
27. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(d)(3).
28. Id. § 11432(e)(1)(A).
29. Id. § 11432(e)(1)(B).
30. Id. § 11432(e)(2).
31. Id. § 11432(e)(3).
32. "[Services include] educational services for which the child meets the eligibility
criteria, such as compensatory educational programs for the disadvantaged, and educational
programs for the handicapped and for students with limited English proficiency; programs in
vocational education; programs for the gifted and talented; and school meals programs." Id.
§ 11432(e)(5).
33. Id. Services are to be in accord with the best interest placement standard of 42 U.S.C.
§ 11432(e)(3).
34. Id. § 11432(e)(6).
35. Educational agency reports from the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa reflect diverse
methodologies for counting the number of homeless children. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
supra note 6, at Table 4. In addition, 36 states did not extrapolate their counts from partial or
one-day data to year-long estimates. Id. at 9. The 216,000 figure represents totals using the
unextrapolated data, while the higher estimate of 273,000 includes data from the 18 states that
extrapolated. Id. The Department of Education's report notes that the totals contained in the
report are "not true totals of similar numbers," and cautions that they are "broad estimates
only." See, e.g., id. at note to Table 3.
36. Id. at 8, Table 3.
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to be broad estimates, they signal a problem of serious proportions.
A. Access to the Educational System
The McKinney Act's equal access policy 38 is supported by provi-
sions aimed at breaking down barriers inhibiting equal access to edu-
cational opportunity. 39 The Act's intent is to ensure that every
homeless child is given the same opportunity to receive free, appropri-
ate educational services as non-homeless children who are state resi-
dents." The McKinney Act addresses two barriers, residency
requirements4 1 and education records requirements,42 that advocacy
groups historically have identified as primary impediments to access
to education for these children.43 Residency requirements can result
not only in express denials of educational opportunity, but also in de
facto denials. For example, when an inter- or intra-school system dis-
pute occurs over the residency of a homeless child and the concomi-
tant responsibility to educate that child, the state's failure to resolve
this dispute in an expeditious manner results in a denial of educa-
tional opportunity for the duration of the gridlock.
Finally, a less tangible, but much more pervasive, barrier exists
that operates to deny access---one to which the McKinney Act
obliquely refers.' This is the barrier of the unknown child. If the
homeless child is not known to the educational system, educators can-
not address or surmount any of the other substantive barriers to
access. The fact is, homeless individuals (including their children) are
hard to find. Many are transient; many are reticent to publicly
acknowledge their status; and many others, struggling to survive,
37. The 1989 extrapolated total represents a 24% increase over the 1988 count. Id. at 11.
When the Department of Education released the lower 1988 figures, Edward E. Smith, the
federal official who prepared the report, indicated that "the policy implications are
staggering." Jennings, Report Expected to Sharpen Policy Debate on Homeless, Educ. Week,
Feb. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 1, 19, col. 1.
38. "[E]ach State educational agency shall assure that each child of a homeless individual
and each homeless youth have access to a free, appropriate public education which would be
provided to the children of a resident of a State and is consistent with the State school
attendance laws ...." 42 U.S.C. § 11431(1). "No child or youth should be denied access to
any educational services simply because he or she is homeless." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 174,
supra note 23, at 93, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 472.
39. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431(2), 11432(e).
40. H.R. CONF. REPort. No. 174, supra note 23, at 93, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 472.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 11431(2).
42. Id. § 11432(e)(6).
43. See NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 12, at 5.
44. The state Coordinator of Education for Homeless Children and Youth must gather
data on the number and location of homeless children in the state. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(d)(1).
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place a low priority on education.4" To the extent that school system
management and the provision of educational services depend upon
information flow, a school system's inability to obtain student infor-
mation may result in the exclusion of that student.
1. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
State residency regulations generally have required that a child
attend school in the school district in which she is a resident or in
which her parent or guardian resides. For the homeless child, resi-
dency determination can be a critical problem because homeless chil-
dren, by definition, have no residence.46 The combination of
ambiguous, statutory definitions and the courts' often intentionalist
statutory construction of residency requirements allows school sys-
tems to disclaim responsibility for educating a "non-resident" child.
Consequently, residency requirements have served effectively to deny
education to numerous homeless children.47
Prior to the McKinney Act, courts decided the few cases con-
cerning the education of homeless children primarily on the basis of
residency law. A New York Department of Education administrative
appeal, Richards v. Board of Education,48 illustrates this approach.
After finding that the petitioner was a resident of the defendant school
district from which the family had moved in order to receive emer-
gency shelter, the New York Commissioner of Education (the "Com-
missioner") found that the petitioner's children were entitled to
receive educational services from that district.49 The decision turned
on the Commissioner's interpretation of the New York school resi-
dency statute, and was predicated on an analysis of the petitioner's
action and intent.50 The Commissioner declined to issue a declara-
tory ruling that any student who became homeless and was placed in
emergency living quarters in a different school district would continue
to be a resident of the school district in which she had attended school
45. See generally J. KOZOL, supra note 3. The United States Department of Education's
1990 Report to Congress is testimony to the multitude of factors compounding problems in
identifying the homeless in our society. See U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., supra note 6, at 5-12.
46. See NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 12, at 5 (stating that
schools sometimes use residency rules "to deny homeless children access to education in any
school district at all").
47. See id. at 5-7.
48. No. 11490, N.Y. Dep't. Educ. (July 17, 1985), reprinted in MATERIALS ON THE
EDUCATION OF HOMELESS CHILDREN, supra note 11, at Section III.A.
49. Id.
50. Id. (finding that Richards had been required to leave her home because of
circumstances beyond her control and that she had neither expressed nor implied any intention
of abandoning her residence or of establishing a new one).
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at the time she became homeless.51 Instead, the Commissioner held
that under state law, each student has the right to attend school in her
district of residence, and that determinations of residency were mixed
questions of law and fact to be decided on a case by case basis.52 In
this and other cases argued prior to the passage of the McKinney
Act,53 litigants fought for the child's placement, which turned on resi-
dency determination. 54 The right to education was never in question.
The removal of the residency barrier was a threshold concern for
the drafters of the McKinney Act. For example, Senator Kennedy
observed that "by definition homeless children have no permanent
residence," and that as a result, "it had been easy for a school district
to say that homeless children are someone else's responsibility."'55
Even after the Senate's passage of the McKinney Act, Senator Moyni-
han emphasized the need for continued efforts on behalf of children
who lose their education rights through local residency rules that
operate to deny public education to children living in shelters or lack-
ing a fixed address.56 The McKinney Act's policy statement reflects
this concern by requiring "any State with a residency requirement as
a component of its compulsory school attendance laws ... to review
and undertake steps to revise such laws to assure that [homeless chil-
dren] are provided a free and appropriate education." 57 A 1988 post-
McKinney Act survey of state educational agencies reported that of
the thirty-three states responding, the majority planned a review and
51. Id. The Commissioner noted that, in the absence of state legislation specifically
addressing the educational rights of homeless children, it was "not possible to declare in a
single ruling the rights of all homeless students placed in temporary housing." Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Delgado v. Freeport Pub. School Dist., 131 Misc. 2d 102, 499 N.Y.S.2d 606
(Sup. Ct. 1986). In Delgado, both the school district of plaintiff's former residence and the
school district to which she had been moved for temporary shelter denied plaintiff education
for her children. Id. at 103, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 608. Basing the question of residency on fact
rather than surmise as to the projected duration of residence, the trial court rejected the
plaintiff's preference to have her children educated in their former district. Id. at 104, 499
N.Y.S.2d at 608. The court found that the plaintiff had not established significant or
determinative ties with the former district to which she had alleged the intention to return; the
ties that were shown "amount[ed] merely to living there." Id. at 105, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
54. See, e.g., id. at 103-04, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 607 (defining issue as one of residency
determination where both school districts refused to enroll the homeless children); Richards,
No. 11490, N.Y. Dept. Educ. (citing N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 3202(1) (1981) for the proposition
that "each student has the right to attend school in his or her school district of residence").
55. 133 CONG. REC. S8944 (daily ed. June 27, 1987) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
56. 133 CONG. REC. S9078 (daily ed. June 30, 1987) (statement of Senator Moynihan).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 11431(2) (1988). The Department of Education's nonregulatory
guidelines reiterate the policy stipulation requiring review of residency laws. U.S. Dep't of
Educ., supra note 18, at 1. The guidelines categorically state that residency requirements
should not pose any barriers to the education of homeless individuals. Id.
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possible revision of state residency laws.58 State implementation
activities include: promulgating regulations'to avoid residency law
denial of access;59 amending residency laws;' issuing legal advisories
from the state board of education to public school districts; 61 and sur-
veying each of the state's local school district residency laws to ensure
compliance.62
Even when there is no express denial based on residency require-
ments, a possibility exists that disputes between two or more school
districts over the residency of a particular homeless child might result
in the child's being denied enrollment in any program.63 Drafters of
the McKinney Act evidenced concern that the potential for disputes,
coupled with the lack of an expeditious dispute resolution mechanism,
could result in de facto denial of education to homeless children.
6 4
Therefore, the Act's conferees stipulated that state plans must contain
a mechanism for resolving disputes "[b]etween and within local edu-
58. S. Jackson, supra note 11, at 3. The Center for Law and Education has compiled a
listing of state education laws that includes residency and attendance requirements. Center for
Law & Educ., State Compulsory School Attendance, Residency and Other Relevant Education
Laws Affecting Homeless School-Age Children, in MATERIALS ON THE EDUCATION OF
HOMELESS CHILDREN, supra note 11, at Section II.C. Notwithstanding the planned review
and revision of state residency laws, a 1990, 20-state survey by the National Law Center on
Homelessness and Poverty found that 12 states still imposed "outright" residency
requirements. NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, SHUT OUT:
DENIAL OF EDUCATION TO HOMELESS CHILDREN 26 (1990).
59. S. Jackson, supra note 11, at 3. Board of Education regulations for the state of New
York now give parents of homeless students the right to choose whether their child attends
school in the district last attended prior to homelessness or the district in which the temporary
shelter is located. Id. at 3, 10 n.13. Changes in New York's residency law affected the
outcome in Orozco v. Sobol, 703 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), in which the plaintiff alleged
denial of access to education and challenged New York's residency requirements as violative of
due process. Id. at 1115. The state adopted regulations changing these residency requirements
prior to trial. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the
plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot as a result of the newly
promulgated residency requirements. Id. at 1116.
60. For example, Connecticut amended its residency law in 1987 to provide that homeless
children may attend school in either the district of temporary residence or the district of
origin. See S. Jackson, supra note 11, at 3, 10 n.14.
61. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., supra note 4, at 7.
62.' Michigan State Bd. of Educ., State Plan for the Administration of the Education of
Homeless Children and Youth Program 9 (1989).
63. See, e.g., Delgado v. Freeport Pub. School Dist., 131 Misc. 2d 102, 499 N.Y.S.2d 606
(Sup. Ct. 1986). In Delgado, a homeless child was effectively denied access to any educational
program while the child's parent and two local school districts fought over the question of
residency. Id. at 103, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
64. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 174, supra note 23, at 93, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 472. The National Coalition for the Homeless was perhaps the first
organization to characterize the situation that results from prolonged disputes over residency
as "de facto denial" of access to education. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS,
supra note 12, at 77.
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cational agencies regarding the responsibility for providing educa-
tional services to homeless children located therein in an expeditious
and timely manner."6 Textually and contextually, the McKinney
Act provision differs from the conferees' intent. The Act calls for
state educational agency plans to provide procedures for "the resolu-
tion of disputes regarding the educational placement of homeless chil-
dren and youth."6 6 On its face, the provision omits any reference to
timeliness, which the conferees thought to be crucial in deterring de
facto denial of education. 67 In addition, by placing the dispute resolu-
tion provision within the content requirements of the state plan, 68 and
failing to reference it within the requirements for local educational
agencies,69 the mechanism is subject to interpretation as a form of an
appeal process at the state level, instead of its intended function as an
expeditor of placement and services at the local level.
The Act's failure to prescribe the procedures to be used for dis-
pute resolution of placement issues resulted in diverse state
approaches-many of which neglected to address the issue of de facto
denial. States appear to be almost evenly divided on whether the
placement issue is to be brought initially to the attention of local or
state officials. 70 Pre-existing complaint management systems within
state educational agencies often are used as mechanisms to handle
McKinney Act placement disputes. 7' Typically, the existing com-
plaint management system within a state educational agency deals
with the entire educational process. By allowing states to incorporate
65. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 174, supra note 23, at 93, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 472 (emphasis added). The Delgado court expressed a similar concern, stressing that
it was essential that the plaintiff's children promptly return to school, and ordering the
appropriate school district to register the children within three days. Delgado, 131 Misc. 2d. at
105-06, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 608-09.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(1)(B) (1988).
67. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
68. 42 U.S.C. § I1432(e)(1)(B).
69. Id. § 11432(e)(3)-(6).
70. S. JACKSON, STATE PLANS FOR THE EDUCATION OF HOMELESS CHILDREN AND
YOUTH: A SELECTED SURVEY OF THIRTY-FIVE STATES 9 (1990) (available from the Center
for Law and Education, Cambridge, MA.).
71. In Texas, for example, the state has appointed both the Division of Complaints and
Administration and the Division of Legal Services to resolve disputes that have arisen over the
placement of homeless children. Division of Special Programs, Texas Educ. Agency, supra
note 2, at 8. Florida, although encouraging litigants to settle disputes at the local level, has
recommended a case by case appeal process at the state level. Homeless Educ. Project, Fla.
Dep't of Educ., Public Education Access for Children of the Homeless: Florida's State
Education Plan for Homeless Children and Youth II (Apr. 1989). In contrast, Ohio has
applied a more literal meaning to the provision by directing the superintendent of public
instruction to determine the school district in which the parent resides in the event of any
disagreement. Ohio Dep't of Educ., State Plan for the Education of Ohio's Homeless Children
and Youth 10 (1989).
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dispute resolution for placement issues into existing complaint man-
agement systems, the McKinney Act may be encouraging states to
expand functionally the scope of the disputes addressed under the
Act.72 The Act's failure unambiguously to require procedures, at the
school district level, for the immediate resolution of conflicts over
placement, could detract from the Act's effectiveness in breaking
down barriers to education that are based on residency. Nevertheless,
state agency mechanisms that are capable of addressing a broad spec-
trum of complaints related to educational placement and program-
ming may, in the long term, prove to be the most constructive vehicles
for safeguarding all of the educational rights set out in the McKinney
Act, including placement rights.73
Only ten out of thirty-five states surveyed by the Center for Law
and Education included specific timelines for dispute resolution.74
Although states may have incorporated timelines into existing state-
level complaint management systems, 75 the states' failure to acknowl-
edge the timelines within their McKinney Act plans belies the confer-
ees' goal of expeditious and timely dispute resolution. The problems
presented by the bureaucratic remoteness of state-level dispute resolu-
tion and the omission of timelines are compounded by the states' fail-
ure to provide interim placement procedures. Less than twenty-five
percent of the states surveyed by the Center for Law and Education
addressed this issue.76 These indices strongly suggest that state edu-
cational agencies are not recognizing the existence of de facto denial.
2. RECORD MANAGEMENT
A lack of education and medical records for homeless students
can present a bureaucratic barrier to education. In the 1987 National
Coalition for the Homeless survey,77 twenty-five percent of the shel-
ters reported difficulty in registering homeless children, and some
homeless children faced actual denial of placement because of a lack
of records from another school district.78 Sixteen state educational
72. For instance, the Georgia state plan construes the dispute resolution process as
applicable to any action "believed to be in non-compliance with the Stewart B. McKinney
Act," and to the "[provision] of public education to a child designated as homeless." Georgia
Dep't of Educ., Georgia State Plan for Homeless 4 (Oct. 1988).
73. This would inadvertently fulfill the drafters' intention to include within the dispute
resolution process disputes over the responsibility for providing educational services. H.R.
CONF REP. No. 174, supra note 23, at 93, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 472.
74. S. JACKSON, supra note 70, at 13.
75. Id. at 14.
76. Id.
77. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 12, at 4.
78. Id. at 10.
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agencies indicated that lack of student records was among the top five
reasons why homeless children were not attending school.79
The McKinney Act addresses this problem by requiring local
educational agencies to maintain school records so that they are avail-
able in a timely manner when a child enters a new school district.80
Although state and local educational agencies may differ on their poli-
cies for matriculating homeless students who lack school records, and
on their mechanisms used for collecting, storing, and retrieving data,
there appears to be substantial dissolution of this barrier.81 Some
states either require or recommend that local educational agencies
enroll homeless children, who are without school records, on
demand. 2  Other states recommend "lenient" local educational
agency policies,83 aimed at preventing delays in enrollment due to fail-
ure to conform to record requirements. Student tracking systems,
systems that provide comprehensive, current information on students
as they move within a school district or from one district to another,
exist at both state and local levels.8 4
3. CHILD IDENTIFICATION
The experience of researchers assisting with the development of
the Georgia state plan for educating homeless children85 illustrates
the difficulty involved in identifying the homeless population.
Researchers canvassed the state's local school systems, county social
services offices responsible for administering the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Program, shelters, community action agencies,
and even sheriff's departments serving eviction notices.8 6 They con-
ducted field surveys in selected counties, aided by social service work-
ers who pointed out known locations of homeless families with
79. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 6, at 10.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(6) (1988).
81. See S. JACKSON, supra note 70, at 15-18.
82. Id. at 15-16. Massachusetts, Iowa, and Pennsylvania prohibit the exclusion of students
due to a lack of records, while Florida, Georgia, Maryland, and Utah recommend enrollment
upon demand. Id.
83. Id. at 16 (including California, Indiana, Minnesota, and North Dakota).
84. Id. at 16-17. California encourages local educational agencies to establish student
tracking systems, Maryland has established a state-wide system, and Florida encourages local
school districts to use the existing student information base for transmitting student records.
Id.
85. In 1987, the Georgia Department of Education contracted with the Center for Public
and Urban Research at Georgia State University to conduct research activities related to
assessing barriers to educational opportunities among homeless children in Georgia. Their
final report is contained in the Georgia State Plan for Homeless, supra note 72, at 6.
86. Id. at 6-10.
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children,8 7 and collected data from the Georgia Office of Migrant
Education.88 The researchers observed that the project "[r]einforced
the notion that counting the homeless is an extremely complex and
difficult task."'89 Even though they believed that the ranges for their
estimates were essentially accurate, they concluded that "[n]o one can
really say how many homeless children there are in Georgia."'
Under the non-prescriptive McKinney Act provisions, the indi-
vidual state educational agency has discretion in formulating and
implementing affirmative child-find efforts. 91 Although one may infer
from the Act's policy statement that the McKinney Act's goal is to
provide free, appropriate public education to all homeless children,92
the Act's provisions do not require the educational agency to act in
concert with other social service providers to identify the total home-
less population.
B. The Provision of a Free, Appropriate Public Education Within
the Educational System
The McKinney Act provides for access to educational opportu-
nity, defined as access to "a free, appropriate public education which
would be provided to the children of a resident of a State and is con-
sistent with State school attendance laws."' 93 The Act does not specif-
ically define a free, appropriate public education. However, the non-
regulatory guidelines adopt the description of comparable services
contained in the Act94 to define the substance of a free, appropriate
public education as "educational services for which the child meets
the eligibility criteria, such as compensatory education programs for
the disadvantaged, and educational programs for the handicapped
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id at 30-31.
89. Id. at 35.
90. Id.
91. The Act requires each state to "gather data on the number and location of homeless
children and youth," but neither stipulates how data is to be collected, nor outlines the level of
effort that educational agencies must extend to locate homeless children. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 11432(d)(1) (1988). States have used, therefore, a vast array of field methodologies and
statistical analyses to identify those children that each state defines as "homeless." This ad hoc
approach has resulted in summary data at the national level that is of limited credibility See
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 6, at 5.
92. "[E]ach State educational agency shall assure that each child of a homeless individual
and each homeless youth have access to a free, appropriate public education .... 42 U.S.C.
§ 11431(1). "The purpose of this subtitle is to make plain the intent and policy of Congress
that every child of a homeless family and each homeless youth be provided the same
opportunities to receive free, appropriate educational services ...." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
174, supra note 23, at 93, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 472 (emphasis added).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 11431(1).
94. Id. § 11432(e)(5).
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and for students with limited English proficiency; programs in voca-
tional education, programs for the gifted and talented; and school
meals program[s]. ' 95
The homeless child is to receive this free, appropriate public edu-
cation (comparable services) in the school in which she has been
placed according to the standards set forth in the Act. 96 This school,
either in the school district of origin or in the district where the child
is actually living, must be the one which is in the child's best inter-
est.97 The McKinney Act thus provides a national standard for place-
ment decisions.98 This best interest standard implies that neither
administrative cost nor convenience should enter into the decision
process. 99 However, neither the McKinney Act nor the non-regula-
95. U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 18, at 2.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(3).
97. Id.
98. In its review of New York State denial of education cases, the Center for Law and
Education attributed erratic results to the varied interpretations of state residency law applied
on a case by case basis instead of on a uniform standard. The Center noted that, with
application and acceptance of homeless education funds under the McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act, decisions would now turn on the "best interest of the child." Center for L.
Educ. Newsnotes, Sept. 1987, at 7, col. 1.
99. Advocates in Massachusetts complained that in the absence of adequate funding for
transportation, the implementation of the McKinney Act's best interest standard meant little.
S. Jackson, supra note 1I, at 4. Historically, the provision of or payment for transportation
has been an issue that administrative agencies considered in placement decisions. The lack of
transportation has often resulted in the outright exclusion of a child. A 1987 survey conducted
by the National Coalition for the Homeless found that 15% of the shelters reported that
shelter children were unable to obtain transportation to school. NATIONAL COALITION FOR
THE HOMELESS, supra note 12, at 9. In 1990, the United States Department of Education
reported to Congress that 28 state educational agencies cited a lack of transportation as one of
the top five reasons why homeless children were not attending school. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
supra note 6, at 10. The convenience and practicality of the available transportation is also an
issue. Long-term busing can make it difficult to attend school. Students are known to have
been bused to former school districts up to 60 miles away from their shelters-a commute that
is guaranteed to have a severe impact upon the child's ability to function during the school
day. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 12, at 10. Drafters of the
McKinney Act also viewed transportation as a component of the educational services to be
provided to homeless children. In addition to educational programs, conferees stated their
intention that services such as transportation be provided at the same level and to the same
degree as those offered to other students in the homeless student's school. H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 174, supra note 23, at 94, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 473. Senator
Kennedy included transportation as a service, along with special programs, that was to be
provided to homeless students just as it was provided to other children. 133 CONG. REC. S8944
(daily ed. June 27, 1985). Interestingly, the provision of the Act covering services to be
provided does not include transportation. The inference is that transportation as an
administrative issue is moot, and that considerations of practicality and convenience related to
transportation will be made under the best interest standard. Notwithstanding this inference,
transportation continues to be an unaddressed barrier to educational access. Eleven of the 35
state plans surveyed by the Center for Law and Education omitted transportation as an issue
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tory guidelines address-who is to make the determination' °° and upon
what child-centered criteria the determination is to be made. Absent
federal direction, state educational agencies have approached these
issues in several different ways. A Center for Law and Education
review of thirty-five state plans found that states typically authorize
education officials, rather than parents, to make placement deci-
sions.10 A minority of plans recommend that education officials
should take parental preferences into account when making place-
ment decisions.102 Only a few states give parents an absolute or pre-
dominant role in the process. 103 In rare instances, state educational
agencies have provided for a team approach that vests a joint decision
in an educational agency representative, the parent(s), and social ser-
vice or health department representatives. °1
In addition to determining who will make placement decisions,
education officials, educators, and parents also should determine the
criteria by which to evaluate options in order to ensure that they are
in the child's best interest. Currently, less than half of the states sur-
veyed identified some type of best interest criteria.10 5 Criteria most
frequently cited included continuity in the educational program and
parental views. °6 However, the state plans offered even those factors
in isolation-with no indication as to how they would be used in the
decisionmaking process. By comparison, Texas views the placement
determination in the child's best interest as a process of decisionmak-
ing milestones, with a built-in default to the school district in which
the child is actually living.107 As part of this process, Texas has iden-
for discussion. S. JACKSON, supra note 70, at 20. Only five states outlined policies and
procedures to meet transportation needs. Id.
100. The state plan is to contain a provision to "[a]uthorize the State educational agency,
the local educational agency, the parent or guardian of the homeless child, the homeless youth,
or the applicable social worker to make determinations required under this section [which
includes placement decisions]." 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(l)(A).
101. S. JACKSON, supra note 70, at 9-10.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id. Parents of homeless children in New York who receive public assistance, and
parents in West Virginia have an absolute right to determine placement. Id. Other states
allocate conditional rights to parents. Massachusetts, for example, allows parental
determination only in those cases where the choice is between placement in one of two school
districts. Id. Where the choice is between attendance areas within the same school district,
the local educational agency determines placement. Id.
104. Id. at 11. In Tennessee, for example, "homeless placement teams" make placement
decisions. Id.
105. Id. at 12.
106. Id.
107. The Texas state plan allows the parent to determine that it is in the best interest of the
child to attend school in the district in which she is living. If the parent concludes that this is
not in the child's best interest, the parent, the school district of origin, and the school district
where the child lives must reach a consensus that it is in the child's best interest to continue
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tified child-centered criteria for officials to use at the dispute resolu-
tion stage to determine what is in the child's best interest. 10, These
include:
Services the student was receiving in the previous school district,
the ability of the school district where the student is temporarily
residing to duplicate those services, the student's success in the
previous school, the likelihood of the student's success in the
school where the student is temporarily residing, the student's rate
of attendance at the previous school, and factors that might affect
the student's rate of attendance if the student remained at the pre-
vious school or attended the school district where the student tem-
porarily resides. 19
The Texas plan is an anomaly. It focuses on comparative aspects
of the two placements--original or current district-in relation to the
student's potential for success. The majority of the states that have
even addressed the issue of the best interest standard have done so in a
much more cursory fashion. They identify isolated indices, in lieu of
grounding the standard in an educational philosophy.
Most state educational agency plans recognize the homeless
child's right to a free, appropriate public education through compara-
ble services as defined in the Act. I10 This boiler-plate language, how-
ever, fails to define substantively either the type of educational
services that will be available to meet the learning needs of the home-
less child or the methods by which state and local educational agen-
cies will deliver their services. Absent statutory direction, those state
plans that went beyond the textual definition did so in a variety of
ways. Some plans delegated additional responsibilities to local educa-
tional agencies, I1  while others recommended local educational
agency activities for homeless student services. 112  A few states
the child in the district of origin. Division of Special Programs, Texas Educ. Agency, supra
note 2, at 20. Lacking consensus, the State assumes that attendance in the school district
where the child is living is in the child's best interest, unless one of the parties initiates the
dispute resolution process. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. S. JACKSON, supra note 70, at 18. "[S]tate plans recited verbatim the McKinney Act
language that local educational agencies provide homeless students with services 'comparable'
to those provided non-homeless children." Id.
111. Id. Responsibilities included the designation of a local educational agency contact
person, the implementation of a "case conference" to plan for individualized educational
services, and the designation of an interagency team to "ensure that the basic needs of
homeless students are met." Id. at 19.
112. Id. Recommendations included characterizing homeless students as " 'at risk' and
thus eligible for certain additional services," creating interagency committees, and
incorporating service issues in school-level plans for the homeless. Id.
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showed an awareness of the need for specific individualized services to
• accommodate the particular needs of homeless students. Georgia, for
example, observed that homeless children may need more educational
instruction than that provided in the typical school day and suggested
that tutorial assistance be offered.1"3 Similarly, Texas acknowledged
the existence of academic deficits in homeless children caused by envi-
ronmental or educational deprivation.114 Although these students do
not qualify for special education because their deficits are not the
result of a handicapping condition, they require appropriate educa-
tional services that address their unique disadvantages."1 ' The Texas
plan categorically states that homeless children will have difficulty
benefiting from education without counseling.I 6 It recommends that
local educational agencies coordinate their counseling services with
other interdisciplinary efforts. 1 7
Ultimately, the provision of a free, appropriate public education
under the McKinney Act is a highly state-subjective matter. It is a
function of each state's interpretation of the best interest standard and
the extent to which the state's provision of comparable services meets
the unique educational needs of the homeless child.
III. EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND SPECIAL EDUCATION
JURISPRUDENCE
Since the 1975 enactment of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act ("EAHCA"),118 the courts have developed a body of
federal jurisprudence' 1 9 from the interplay of the EAHCA with the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as codified at 42 U.S.C.
113. Georgia Dep't of Educ., supra note 72, at 37-38.
114. Division of Special Programs, Texas Educ. Agency, supra note 2, at 12.
115. One example provided by Texas is that of a five-year-old who, because he had been
brought up in a shelter, had not acquired the language experiences of a typical five-year old.
Although the student would exhibit a severe language deficit at school, the deficit would not be
attributable to a handicapping condition. Lacking an identifiable handicapping condition, this
child may not be eligible for special education services to remedy his language problem. Id.
116. Id. at 13. This conclusion was based on three factors: (1) a Texas survey of shelter
directors finding that 52% of the respondents believed that homeless children need counseling
services to increase the likelihood of their success in school; (2) the educational agency's
responsiveness to recent research findings; and (3) the educational agency's understanding of
the life situation of the homeless. Id.
117. S. JACKSON, supra note 70, at 19.
118. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-
1485 (1988)).
119. This Comment adopts Wegner's identification and description of a composite special
education jurisprudence. Wegner, Educational Rights of Handicapped Children: Three
Federal Statutes and an Evolving Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2), 17 J.L. & EDUC. 387, 625 (1988).
Wegner demonstrates that each of the three federal statutes reflects distinctive approaches to
protecting members of vulnerable groups, yet together provide a fundamentally coherent
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§ 1983,120 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.121 Liti-
gants have used section 1983 and section 504 extensively to assert
claims for handicapped children in areas not covered by the EAHCA,
or where the EAHCA would provide only limited remedies. 122
The EAHCA is highly prescriptive, comprehensive legislation
designed to ensure that handicapped children receive education
appropriate to their needs. 123 Its individual child-centered focus, pre-
mised on a zero-reject principle, provides handicapped children with a
clear entitlement to a free, appropriate public education. 124 The stat-
ute guarantees procedural rights to ensure that handicapped children
receive their entitlement. 125
Section 1983 creates no new substantive rights.' 26 Rather, advo-
cates use it as a vehicle for asserting rights drawn from other
sources. 27 Litigants must establish two elements to state a prima
facie case under section 1983: the conduct complained of must be
committed by a person acting under color of state law, and the con-
duct must deprive the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. 128  The United States Supreme Court has
narrowed the construction of section 1983 to permit its use in assert-
ing rights arising under other federal statutes only in those cases
where the underlying statute creates enforceable rights, but does not
provide its own comprehensive remedial scheme.' 29 Either state or
special education jurisprudence that can serve as a framework to aid litigants and the courts.
Id. at 696.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)..
121. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
122. Wegner, supra note 119, at 388-89.
123. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1401, 1406 & 1411-1420 (1988).
124. Id. § 1400(c).
125. Id. § 1415.
126. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979) (concluding that
section 1983, standing alone, provides no new protection for civil rights as it provides no new
substantive rights at all). Section 1983 states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
127. Chapman, 441 U.S. at 618.
128. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (stating that section 1983 provides a
civil remedy for deprivation of federally protected rights where the essential elements are
present).
129. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
13-15 (1981) (holding that the underlying statute with its own comprehensive remedial scheme
does not give rise to a section 1983 remedy).
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federal courts may hear section 1983 claims, 130 and plaintiffs may pur-
sue these claims under federal jurisdiction without having exhausted
all available state administrative remedies.13 1 For purposes of section
1983 lawsuits, employees of state and local education agencies have
generally been found to have acted under color of law. 132
Congress's objective in enacting section 504 was to remedy dis-
crimination of the handicapped in the areas of education, employ-
ment, and access to public facilities. 33 Although limited to federally
funded programs, section 504 is characterized by broad coverage.
"Handicapped individuals" include those who have "a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of [their]
major life activities, [have a] record of such impairment, [or] are
regarded as having such an impairment."'134 Children falling outside
of the classification of handicapped under the EAHCA, but covered
under section 504, include those with AIDS, alcoholism, or tempo-
rary disabilities. 135 Insofar as the circumstances and conditions faced
by homeless children impair their ability to learn, they may be able to
assert claims under section 504, as homeless handicapped children, to
access benefits from federally funded programs.
Congress designed section 504 to control institutional behavior
130. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980) (noting that state courts may, but
are not required to, hear claims under section 1983).
131. Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502-12 (1982) (holding that exhaustion
of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under section 1983).
132. See, e.g., Manecke v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 762 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1985)
(local educational agency); Rose v. Nebraska, 748 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1984) (state employee
and state educational agency).
133. Section 504, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely by reason of
her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
134. Id. § 706(8)(B). Regulations define "physical or mental impairment" as:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech
organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder,
such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefit-
ing from Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i) (1989). "Major life activi-
ties" include "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Id. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii).
135. Wegner, supra note 119, at 648.
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by insuring that federal funds not be expended in a discriminatory
way. As such, it prohibits three types of conduct: exclusion, denial of
benefits, and discrimination. 3 6 An unjustified determination that a
handicapped child is unqualified and, therefore, ineligible to partici-
pate in an activity or program is an example of exclusion.1 37 When a
handicapped child meets applicable selection and retention criteria for
a program, but is denied an opportunity to participate meaningfully in
it, a denial of benefits occurs.13 Discrimination occurs when there is
unequal treatment of handicapped and non-handicapped students. 3 9
A. Access to the Educational System
All handicapped children, including homeless handicapped chil-
dren, are guaranteed a free, appropriate education under the
EAHCA.1 4° Estimates of the number of homeless children who
would qualify for services under the EAHCA tend to be higher than
those for the population as a whole. 4 ' There is a likelihood that,
given the socio-psychological problems associated with the environ-
mental condition of homelessness, homeless children are at high risk
for developmental disabilities. 42 Nevertheless, at least two factors
operate to deny special education opportunities to homeless children.
The first is imbedded in the basic problem of identification.143 States
cannot provide services to a homeless child who cannot be found.
Unlike the McKinney Act, however, the EAHCA is premised upon a
zero-reject, child find policy; 44 a state violates the EAHCA's require-
ments if it fails to identify all homeless handicapped children within
its jurisdiction. The second factor operating to deny special education
opportunities to homeless children arises when states fail to identify
and place in special education programs homeless students who are in
school, and who would qualify for the EAHCA programs and serv-
ices. The transiency of many homeless children precludes access to
136. Id. at 400.
137. Id. (giving examples of unjustified determinations, including the imposition of
unjustified screening criteria that precludes participation in intramural sports, or the incorrect
conclusion that certain handicapped children cannot participate safely in a mainstream
educational program).
138. A school district may refuse to make threshold accommodations that would enable the
child to participate, thus denying him the benefit. Id.
139. Id.
140. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(e) (1988).
141. See, e.g., Russell & Williams, supra note 3, at 3-5 (1988) (positing that homeless
children are at high risk of handicaps due to prenatal, postnatal, and early childhood
environments).
142. Id. at 3-4.
143. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
144. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1413.
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special education programs because the student is not in a school or
district long enough to complete the often extensive educational eval-
uation and placement process required under the EAHCA. 45 Advo-
cates for homeless children should press claims under the EAHCA
when either factor operates to deny access to special education serv-
ices. Advocates should also bring suit when inflexible procedures for
participation in special education programs systematically discrimi-
nate against homeless handicapped children whose mobility prevents
them from meeting the established service delivery models.
Because rights under the EAHCA are generally more extensive
than those afforded under section 1983, only a small body of case law
exists concerning educational rights of handicapped children under
section 1983 claims.146 The majority of these claims are in the area of
procedural due process.147 Federal courts have found a protected
interest either through a state constitutional right or in a state's com-
mitment to recognize that handicapped children have a right to a free,
appropriate education as a matter of state law in order to qualify for
federal funds under the EAHCA. 4 Assuming that a protected inter-
est exists, the claim turns on whether the state has deprived the child
of that interest without due process of law. A constitutional violation
may only be shown, however, where a child has been denied an appro-
priate education, not where the educational agency has failed to pro-
vide her with the most appropriate education.'49
Courts have found that handicapped children have been deprived
of their interest in two types of cases.' 50 The first is where the state
has failed to provide a meaningful hearing prior to governmental
actions that would have the effect of denying a free, appropriate pub-
lic education."'5 The second involves de facto denials of procedural
due process. 15 2 These claims typically involve cases of fundamentally
145. See Division of Special Programs, Texas Educ. Agency, supra note 2, at 11.
146. Wegner, supra note 119, at 626 (stating that litigants generally bring section 1983
claims in connection with educational rights of handicapped children as the basis for attorney's
fees awards).
147. Id. (noting courts' "growing recognition" and allowance of due process claims, even
though they are likely to be available only in "rare, egregious situations").
148. Id. at 627.
149. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Pontiac School Dist., 807 F.2d 75, 79 (6th Cir. 1986) (adhering
to the view that due process secures no right to the most appropriate educational placement).
150. Wegner, supra note 119, at 627.
151. Id For example, in one case where the state had denied a child access to educational
services for almost two years while school personnel failed to hold the necessary conference to
develop an individualized educational program, a federal court found that the school's inaction
failed to provide even the minimal procedural due process protections. Id. (citing Jackson v.
Franklin County School Bd., 806 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1986)).
152. Id. at 628.
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flawed administrative review process. 15 3
State assurances under the McKinney Act that each homeless
child will have access to a free, appropriate public education, sup-
ported by state compliance with revision of residency law require-
ments, present the necessary protected interest under section 1983.
Claims under section 1983 challenging arbitrary denial of access to
education for homeless children may fall into either of the aforemen-
tioned categories. For example, state or local educational agency fail-
ure to implement dispute resolution procedures to provide for the
timely placement of a homeless child could trigger a claim asserting
lack of due process prior to governmental action. Local educational
agencies that place homeless students in programs based on a flawed
best interest standard may be vulnerable to a claim of de facto denial
of procedural due process.
Equal protection claims for handicapped children also have been
asserted under section 1983. With the exception of earlier cases
addressing either exclusion of handicapped students as a group from
state-funded educational programs or the denial of appropriate serv-
ices to an individual child,' 54 equal protection claims have been rela-
tively unsuccessful.' 5 This is attributable primarily because such
claims do not evoke enhanced scrutiny. The Court's refusal to recog-
nize a federally protected right to education, 56 and the determination
that classification on the basis of handicap is not a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification, 5 7 have resulted in a lower level of scrutiny.
Nonetheless, outright exclusion of homeless children from state-
funded educational opportunities by school districts that continue to
153. Id. Examples of de facto denials of procedural due process include cases in which a
question exists as to the impartiality of a hearing officer and those in which state educational
procedures allow someone other than an impartial hearing officer to make administrative
review determinations. Id.
154. See Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that learning
disabled students who are not receiving instruction specifically suited to their handicaps stated
a claim for relief under equal protection clause); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972) (addressing systematic exclusion).
155. See Wegner, supra note 119, at 630. Often the courts dispose of equal protection
claims on the merits by rejecting litigants' assertions that the absence of desired educational
services gives rise to a constitutional exclusion, by determining that the litigant has failed to
show an inequality of treatment between handicapped and non-handicapped children, or by
maintaining that the Constitution does not require that handicapped children receive special
services. Id.
156. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (stating that although public education is
not a fundamental right, it is more than some "governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from
other forms of social welfare legislation") (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (stating that public education is not a right granted to the
individual by the Constitution)).
157. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-43 (1985).
[Vol. 45:537
1990-19911 EDUCATION FOR HOMELESS CHILDREN
interpret state residency laws in a discriminatory manner may be
actionable under section 1983 as a violation of the equal protection
clause. 1581
Claims of substantial denial of educational opportunity are
actionable under section 504 in cases where many students have
"experienced serious adverse effects amounting to exclusion from or
denial of educational opportunities as a result of policies or practices
of state or local educational agencies."' 59 It is well settled, however,
that in individual cases, as well as in cases involving systemic flaws, a
litigant must show substantial injury. Routine disputes concerning
the appropriate program or placement or minor procedural irregulari-
ties are not actionable.16°
Section 504 could provide a vehicle for homeless section 504-
handicapped children to assert claims for substantial denials of educa-
tional opportunity. A state's failure to develop and implement state
plan requirements related to breaking down barriers to educational
access-as in a failure to provide transportation-would be grounds
for a claim.
B. The Provision of a Free, Appropriate Public Education Within
the Educational System
Under the EAHCA, the guarantee of a free, appropriate public
education' 6' is composed of: (1) "special education," defined as "spe-
158. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Caitlin v. Ambach, 1986-87 Educ.
Handicapped L. Rep. (CRR) 558:165 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that school district's refusal
to provide educational services based on residency of handicapped child's parents violated
equal protection clause where interests in local autonomy, proper planning for schools, and
availability of financial resources were not at issue).
159. See Wegner, supra note 119, at 636. Courts have found violations of section 504
where:
Far-reaching problems with personnel and budget support . . . led to deficient
identification and diagnostic processes and plainly inadequate counseling
services; . . . where school officials categorically excluded a group of mentally
retarded students from participation in public school classes based on unfounded
concerns that they would transmit hepatitis-B to other students; where a state's
failure to provide adequate support led to a breakdown and long delays in the
evaluation and placement of students; and where special day schools for seriously
emotionally disturbed students lacked adequate support staff, curriculum and
facilities.
Id. (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 637 (citing Timms v. Metropolitan School Dist., 722 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1983);
Powell v. Defoe, 699 F.2d 1078 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (dicta); and Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d
1164 (8th Cir. 1982)). "The United States Office of Civil Rights also declines to pursue routine
complaints regarding programming and placement unless exceptional circumstances such as
exclusion from educational opportunities are alleged." Id. at 637 n.62 (citing Conel, Aronson
& Whitted (IL), Educ. Handicapped L. Rep. (CRR) 257:427 (OCR 1985)).
161. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1988) (including special education and related services).
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cially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians to meet
the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruc-
tion, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruc-
tion in hospitals and institutions"; 62 and (2) "related services,"
which includes "transportation, and such developmental, corrective,
and other supportive services... as may be required to assist a handi-
capped child to benefit from special education."'163 The provision of a
free, appropriate public education is one of the most nettlesome
requirements of the statute. Since the EAHCA's enactment, the
courts have developed a body of litigation concerning the substantive
definition of "appropriate.""' The United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision, in Board of Education v. Rowley, 165 defined
"appropriate" education as "consist[ing] of educational instruction
specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child,
supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to
benefit' from the instruction."'16 6 The Court held that the statute did
not describe the level of educational programming necessary to satisfy
the benefit test. 167 In its review of legislative history, the Court found
that Congress was concerned with providing access to public educa-
tion for handicapped children, not with providing a particular level of
services.'68 According to the Court, a student in the regular class-
room receives some benefit as long as a student's individualized pro-
gram is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing
marks and advance from grade to grade."'' 69  Post-Rowley, courts
have not ordered schools to provide the best possible education or to
maximize student potential. 70
This interpretation of "appropriate" education presents an inter-
esting situation for homeless handicapped children falling under the
EAHCA. The Rowley Court rejected the equal opportunity standard
used by the trial court,' 7' and in so doing, rejected as well the proposi-
tion that handicapped children are entitled to a level of services com-
162. Id. (defining free, appropriate public education to include special education and related
services); see id. § 1401(16) (defining special education).
163. Id. § 1401(17).
164. See generally Myers & Jenson, The Meaning of "Appropriate" Educational
Programming Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 3 S. ILL. U.L.J. 401
(1984) (tracing the concept of "appropriate" educational programming through case law).
165. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
166. Id. at 188-89.
167. Id. at 189.
168. Id. at 192.
169. Id. at 203-04 (footnote omitted).
170. See, e.g., Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565, 1570-71
(11 th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 468 U.S. 1213 (1984).
171. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189-90 (stating that statutory language "contains no requirement
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parable to that provided to non-handicapped children. In contrast,
the McKinney Act, with its equal opportunity policy, specifies com-
parability of services.172 If this provision is read broadly, advocates
could argue that homeless handicapped children are entitled to more
than the "some-benefit" standard under the EAHCA.
Interpretation of the McKinney Act's equal opportunity stan-
dard may be impacted by section 504 precedent. Early claims
brought under section 504 raised the question whether the statute's
equal opportunity mandate required objective equality of opportunity
by permitting access to existing programs as they were presently
designed, or subjective equality necessitating modification of pro-
grams to meet the needs of handicapped children. In Southeastern
Community College v. Davis,'73 the Court adopted the objective equal-
ity standard when it ruled that section 504 required "evenhanded
action," rather than "substantial modifications," to reshape programs
to meet the needs of the handicapped. 174 In 1985, the Court clarified
the Davis holding, stating that the decision entailed:
str[iking] a balance between the statutory rights of the handi-
capped to be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of
federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs:
while a grantee need not be required to make "fundamental" or
"substantial" modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it
may be required to make "reasonable ones."''17
The Court predicated this ruling on an understanding that although
the needs of handicapped children need not be fully met, equal treat-
ment of unequals can effectively deny equal opportunity. 76
Litigants may be able to use section 504's equal opportunity
premise to attack the basic educational structure of the McKinney
Act. The McKinney Act, by equating free, appropriate public educa-
tion with comparable services, could be viewed as treating unequals
equally. If a litigant can show that the condition of homelessness
affects the child's ability to learn, then the litigant could argue that
providing homeless children with services comparable to services
designed for children who are able to learn is tantamount to denial of
equal treatment under the law.
Under this interpretation, section 504 homeless children may be
... that States maximize the potential of handicapped children 'commensurate with the
opportunity provided to other children' ").
172. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(5) (1988).
173. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
174. Id. at 405, 410-11 & 413.
175. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985).
176. Id. at 297-99.
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entitled to some modification in programs in order to accommodate
their learning problems. For example, they may be entitled to sum-
mer school programs to compensate for periods of absence during the
school year. Procedures for special education placement and pro-
gramming may be adapted to accommodate the transiency of home-
less children. Protection of individual children under section 504
mandates that handicapped children cannot be suspended or expelled
for misconduct related to the handicapping condition.17 7 This provi-
sion may apply to behavior exhibited by homeless children as a result
of the stressfulness of their homeless situation.
Section 504 also may provide homeless children with some pro-
tection from arbitrary procedural requirements. Litigants have raised
actionable claims successfully for children denied any meaningful
educational program178 and for those denied an appropriate educa-
tion,179 as a result of serious procedural flaws. Similarly, "any deci-
sion or action that in practice prevents a child from benefiting from
the federally-funded educational program" may give rise to a section
504 claim.1 80 Litigants may assert these rights for homeless children
as long as substantial injury can be shown. So employed, section 504
would serve to reinforce the best interest standard of the McKinney
Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
The McKinney Act provides a wellspring for the pursuit of edu-
cational programs and services for homeless children. It sets out
national policy and puts into place a framework of state assurances
and requirements for local educational agencies. In turn, this frame-
work provides both a state property interest in education for homeless
children and standards and requirements related to that interest. It
177. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that a school must
accompany expulsion by a determination as to whether a handicapped student's misconduct is
related to her handicap).
178. See Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 936-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that a
private right of action under section 504 for money damages is appropriate where a
handicapped child is allegedly discriminated against through denial of educational programs
based on child's physical and mental handicaps).
179. See Sanders v. Marquette Pub. Schools, 561 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(holding that a cause of action exists where a plaintiff claims that defendant's failure to assess
properly and accommodate disabilities denied her the benefit of measures that would have
made education appropriate); Boxall v. Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1109-10
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (recognizing a private right of action to review questions of what constitutes
an "appropriate" education).
180. See John A. v. Gill, 565 F. Supp. 372, 383 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (recognizing a cause of
action for allegations related to defendant's failure to process appeals related to educational
placements of handicapped children).
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can, therefore, serve as a vehicle for educational claims arising under
the Act itself or under section 1983. Rights may flow from the federal
policy enumerated within the Act or from a state's statutes, plans, and
procedures developed in response to the Act's requirements.
The McKinney Act's effectiveness, however, is limited in part by
its non-prescriptive requirements and its failure to provide any sort of
guarantee of free, appropriate educational programming. Although
states must submit detailed plans to receive funding' under the Act,
they are allowed great latitude in actual implementation. Moreover,
the Act imposes no sanctions for noncompliance with its provisions.
Another weakness of the McKinney Act is the flawed educa-
tional premise that homeless children are subject to educational
needs-and consequently rights--comparable to those of non-home-
less children. Educational research and the experience of state educa-
tors and advocates, evidenced by the textual material of individual
state plans, confirm the differences between homeless and non-home-
less children. Homelessness affects the ability to learn. Therefore, an
act predicated upon the provision of a free, appropriate public educa-
tion, textually defined as services comparable to those provided to stu-
dents who are residents of the state, is insufficient. Only the grosser
violations of a homeless child's educational rights are addressed under
this educational standard. If a homeless child is to attend and benefit
from school, and ultimately break the cycle of homelessness, the state
must recognize her unequal ability to learn. The courts must inter-
pret the McKinney Act, which textually treats unequals as equals, in
its broadest sense.
The recently enacted amendments to the McKinney Act'82
address some of the weaknesses discussed in this Comment. The
amendments both expand some of the statutory rights for homeless
children8 3 and increase the probability that educational services
181. Congress had under-funded the Act's educational provisions since the original
authorization of $12.5 million. This included $5 million in guaranteed grants to states for
fiscal years 1987 and 1988, and an additional $2.5 million in exemplary grants to state or local
agencies in fiscal year 1988. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11432(g), 11433(f) (1988). Congressional
authorizations for the Act's extension to fiscal years 1989 and 1990 were the same as in the
original Act. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-628, § 702(a)(5)(b), 102 Stat. 3245 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11432(g), 11433(f)
(1988)). However, the 1990 amendments increased authorizations to $50 million for fiscal year
1990, and "such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 1992 and 1993." Stewart
B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-645, 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 4673 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11301).
182. Pub. L. No. 101-645, §§612, 723, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104
Stat.) at 4735, 4739.
183. Congress enlarged the scope of the Act's policy statement. In addition to addressing
the dissolution of the barrier caused by residency requirements in attendance laws, the Act
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available under these rights will reach the child. 1 4  However,
although the amendments hold great promise, the Act remains a non-
prescriptive statute whose effectiveness is dependent on the quality of
state and local educational agency implementation. Moreover, to the
extent that the implementation of new provisions requires the devel-
opment of state and local delivery systems, the amendments' impact
will be delayed. But most importantly, the amendments still fail to
answer the questions that would unlock the meaning of the Act's stat-
utory rights for homeless children. They fail to define what is a free,
appropriate public education, provided through an educational place-
ment determined under a best interest standard.
It is at this point that the incorporation of rights growing out of
special education jurisprudence is essential. These rights can provide
teeth for the McKinney Act. They can provide procedural rights and
substantive interpretations needed to meet the unique educational
needs of homeless children. The McKinney Act, together with the
EAHCA, section 1983, and section 504, can help to resolve the para-
dox of the homeless school-age child.
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now encompasses "other laws, regulations, practices, or policies that may act as a barrier to
the enrollment, attendance, or success in school." Id. § 612 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 11431). Identified problems now include transportation issues and enrollment delays caused
by immunization requirements and guardianship issues. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 11432(e)(l)(G)). State plans are to provide for theprompt resolution of disputes-inferring a
prohibition against practices that result in the de facto denial of education to homeless
students. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(l)(B)). The Act now recognizes the right
not only to enroll and to attend, but also to succeed in school. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 11432(c)(2)) (providing that grants be used for "activities for and services to homeless
children and homeless youths that enable such children and youths to enroll in, attend and
achieve success in school").
184. The authorized funding level for fiscal year 1991 is 10 times greater than fiscal year
1990. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)). State educational agencies may use these
funds for grants to local educational agencies "for the purpose of facilitating the enrollment,
attendance and success of homeless children and youths in schools." Id. § 723 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 11433 (a)(l)). Assuming that local educational agencies respond to this funding
carrot, and apply for grant monies, they now will have the wherewithal to provide a variety of
educational and support services to homeless children. The Amendments specify that primary
activities, which must account for not less that 50% of the grant funds, include "tutoring,
remedial education services, or other education services." Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 11433(b)). Other related activities for which states may use grant funds include expedited
evaluations, assistance to defray excess transportation costs, before- and after-school and
summer programs, counseling, social work and psychological services, and the purchase of
school supplies. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11433(b)(2)).
